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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book

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203540

Readings in formal epistemology

sourcebook

edited byHoracio Arló-CostaVincent F. Hendricks Johan van Benthem

Abstract

This volume presents 38 classic texts in formal epistemology, and strengthens the ties between research into this area of philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual disciplines. The editors provide introductions to five subsections: Bayesian Epistemology, Belief Change, Decision Theory, Interactive Epistemology and Epistemic Logic.

'Formal epistemology' is a term coined in the late 1990s for a new constellation of interests in philosophy, the origins of which are found in earlier works of epistemologists, philosophers of science and logicians. It addresses a growing agenda of problems concerning knowledge, belief, certainty, rationality, deliberation, decision, strategy, action and agent interaction – and it does so using methods from logic, probability, computability, decision and game theory. The volume also includes a thorough index and suggestions for further reading, and thus offers a complete teaching and research package for students as well as research scholars of formal epistemology, philosophy, logic, computer science, theoretical economics and cognitive psychology. ​

Details | Table of Contents

Agency and interaction what we are and what we do in formal epistemology Jeffrey HelznerVincent F. Hendricks

pp.1-11

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_1
Introduction Horacio Arló-CostaVincent F. Hendricks Johan van Benthem

pp.15-19

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_2
Truth and probability Ramsey Eric RamseyFrank P. Ramsey

pp.21-45

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_3
Probable knowledge Richard C. Jeffrey

pp.47-65

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_4
Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief Bas C. van Fraassen

pp.67-89

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_5
A theory of higher order probabilities Haim Gaifman

pp.91-106

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_6
On indeterminate probabilities Isaac Levi

pp.107-129

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_7
Why I am not a Bayesian Clark Glymour

pp.131-151

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_8
Discussion

a mistake in dynamic coherence arguments?

Brian Skyrms

pp.153-161

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_9
Some problems for conditionalization and reflection Frank Arntzenius

pp.163-176

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_10
Stopping to reflect Mark J. SchervishTeddy SeidenfeldJoseph B. Kadane

pp.177-185

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_11
Introduction Horacio Arló-CostaVincent F. Hendricks Johan van Benthem

pp.189-193

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_12
On the logic of theory change

partial meet contraction and revision functions

Carlos E. AlchourrónPeter GärdenforsDavid Makinson

pp.195-217

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_13
Theory contraction and base contraction unified Sven Ove Hansson

pp.219-245

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_14
How infallible but corrigible full belief is possible Isaac Levi

pp.247-267

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_15
Belief contraction in the context of the general theory of rational choice Hans Rott

pp.269-302

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_16
A survey of ranking theory Wolfgang Spohn

pp.303-347

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_17
Introduction Horacio Arló-CostaVincent F. Hendricks Johan van Benthem

pp.351-355

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_18
Allais's paradox Leonard Savage

pp.357-360

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_19
Decision theory without "independence" or without "ordering" Teddy Seidenfeld

pp.361-384

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_20
Ambiguity and the bayesian paradigm Itzhak GilboaMassimo Marinacci

pp.385-439

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_21
State-dependent utilities Mark J. SchervishTeddy SeidenfeldJoseph B. Kadane

pp.441-455

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_22
Causal decision theory James Joyce

pp.457-491

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_23
Advances in prospect theory

cumulative representation of uncertainty

Amos TverskyDaniel Kahneman

pp.493-519

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_24
Introduction Horacio Arló-CostaVincent F. Hendricks Johan van Benthem

pp.523-525

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_25
Epistemology without knowledge and without belief Jaakko Hintikka

pp.527-551

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_26
Epistemic operators Fred Dretske

pp.553-566

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_27
Elusive knowledge David Lewis

pp.567-586

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_28
Knowledge and scepticism Robert Nozick

pp.587-603

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_29
On logics of knowledge and belief Robert Stalnaker

pp.605-626

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_30
Sentences, belief and logical omniscience, or what does deduction tell us? Rohit Parikh

pp.627-647

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_31
The logic of justification Sergei Artemov

pp.649-693

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_32
Learning theory and epistemology Kevin T. Kelly

pp.695-716

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_33
Some computational constraints in epistemic logic Timothy Williamson(Oxford University)

pp.717-734

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_34
Introduction Horacio Arló-CostaVincent F. Hendricks Johan van Benthem

pp.737-739

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_35
Convention (an excerpt on coordination and higher-order expectations) David Lewis

pp.741-757

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_36
Three views of common knowledge Jon Barwise

pp.759-772

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_37
The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions Alexandru BaltagLawrence S. Moss Sławomir Solecki

pp.773-812

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_38
A qualitative theory of dynamic interactive belief revision Alexandru BaltagSonja Smets

pp.813-858

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_39
Agreeing to disagree Robert Aumann

pp.859-862

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_40
Epistemic conditions for nash equilibrium Robert Aumann

pp.863-894

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41
Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games Robert Stalnaker

pp.895-922

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_42
Substantive rationality and backward induction Joseph Y. Halpern

pp.923-932

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_43

Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Dordrecht

Year: 2016

Pages: 937

Series: Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy

Series volume: 1

ISBN (hardback): 978-3-319-20450-5

ISBN (digital): 978-3-319-20451-2

Full citation:

Arló-Costa Horacio, Hendricks Vincent F., van Benthem Johan (2016) Readings in formal epistemology: sourcebook. Dordrecht, Springer.