Decision theory without "independence" or without "ordering"
pp. 361-384
Abstract
It is a familiar argument that advocates accommodating the paradoxes of decision theory by abandoning the "independence" postulate. After all, if we grant that choice reveals preference, the anomalous choice patterns of the Allais and Ellsberg problems (reviewed in section "Review of the Allais and Ellsberg "Paradoxes") violate postulate P2 ('sure thing") of Savage's (The foundations of statistics. Wiley, New York, 1954) system.
Publication details
Published in:
Arló-Costa Horacio, Hendricks Vincent F., van Benthem Johan (2016) Readings in formal epistemology: sourcebook. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 361-384
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_20
Full citation:
Seidenfeld Teddy (2016) „Decision theory without "independence" or without "ordering"“, In: H. Arló-Costa, V. F. Hendricks & J. Van Benthem (eds.), Readings in formal epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer, 361–384.