Epistemic conditions for nash equilibrium
pp. 863-894
Abstract
Game theoretic reasoning has been widely applied in economics in recent years. Undoubtedly, the most commonly used tool has been the strategic equilibrium of Nash (Ann Math 54:286–295, 1951), or one or another of its so-called "refinements." Though much effort has gone into developing these refinements, relatively little attention has been paid to a more basic question: Why consider Nash equilibrium in the first place?
Publication details
Published in:
Arló-Costa Horacio, Hendricks Vincent F., van Benthem Johan (2016) Readings in formal epistemology: sourcebook. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 863-894
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41
Full citation:
Aumann Robert (2016) „Epistemic conditions for nash equilibrium“, In: H. Arló-Costa, V. F. Hendricks & J. Van Benthem (eds.), Readings in formal epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer, 863–894.