Maurice Merleau-Ponty e la verità del naturalismo
In this text I shall try to understand what Merleau-Ponty means when he says that there is a ‘truth of naturalism’. Although this formulation apparently assumes different meanings in different periods of his philosophical production, at a closer look it discloses a unitary view on the problem of naturalism. In order to grasp such a unitary account, philosophy needs a more complex definition of ‘nature’, which is neither materialistic nor pantheistic. Philosophy needs a definition capable of bringing about a more original sense of nature as ‘primordial being’, that is, as an always already meaningful nature that has not a ‘mind’ at the opposite, rather being the source of every correlation. This view can help philosophy and science, as I shall argue, in making sense of the scientific discourse about consciousness and the mental without falling pray to either Cartesian dualism or other unwanted presuppositions.
Summa Michela, Giuffrida Pietro (2013). Naturalism and subjectivity. Metodo 1 (2).
D'Angelo Diego (2013). Maurice Merleau-Ponty e la verità del naturalismo. Metodo 1 (2), pp. 129-142.