In the last chapter, we investigated the irruption of self-organization into Kant's critical system, its incompatibility with the mechanistic and rule-bound spatiotemporal individuation proposed in the first Critique, and the unstable resolution of its problematic status in the Antinomy of Judgment. As we saw, the demand posed by the ontological evidence of organization to transcendental philosophy was only suspended and diverted by the introduction of reflective judgment, the employment of analogy for scientific investigation and, last but not least, the symbolic usage of the organism, for the sake of the systemic unity of critique and its theistic destination. In this chapter we will consider: (1) how Kant himself transformed his conceptualization of individuality in nature, extracting it from a strictly teleological inquiry and bringing it into the purview of a general theory of matter, covering the structure of natural machines as well as individuation of matter into bodies; (2) the legacy of Kant's arguments for the distinction between organic and mechanical modalities of individuation on twentieth-century debates, in particular on theories of autopoiesis and on Whitehead's philosophy of the organism. I shall conclude the chapter with a brief reflection on the effects of such transformations in our understanding of individual or individuating organization on the very idea of a transcendental philosophy.