In the wake of neo-Kantian interpretations, the Critical philosophy has often been neatly partitioned, in line with the distinction between the practical and speculative interests of reason, into an epistemology of scientific research and a theory of moral action.¹ The Critique of Judgment, approached from the vantage point of Kant's own projected metaphysics of nature, or from the related position of an ontology of individuation, proves such a fertile text precisely on account of its capacity to force thought out of any purported alternative or complementarity between theory and action, and into a reckoning with the speculative foundations and the momentous consequences of the commerce which Kant deploys between the two interests or domains of reason, pure and practical.² Specifically, it allows us to circumscribe within Kant's work, in the midst of its inner tensions and developments, the constitution of a problem — that of self-organization — which provides the enduring, if sometimes unacknowledged, matrix through which much of post-Kantian philosophy has approached the problem of individuation.