Empiricist criteria of cognitive significance
problems and changes
pp. 65-85
Abstract
It is a basic principle of contemporary empiricism that a sentence makes a cognitively significant assertion, and thus can be said to be either true or false, if and only if either (1) it is analytic or contradictory — in which case it is said to have purely logical meaning or significance — or else (2) it is capable, at least potentially, of test by experiential evidence — in which case it is said to have empirical meaning or significance. The basic tenet of this principle, and especially of its second part, the so-called testability criterion of empirical meaning (or better: meaningfulness), is not peculiar to empiricism alone: it is characteristic also of contemporary operationism, and in a sense of pragmatism as well; for the pragmatist maxim that a difference must make a difference to be a difference may well be construed as insisting that a verbal difference between two sentences must make a difference in experiential implications if it is to reflect a difference in meaning.
Publication details
Published in:
Harding Sandra (1976) Can theories be refuted?: essays on the Duhem-Quine thesis. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 65-85
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_3
Full citation:
Hempel Carl Gustav (1976) „Empiricist criteria of cognitive significance: problems and changes“, In: S. Harding (ed.), Can theories be refuted?, Dordrecht, Springer, 65–85.