Reasons and persuasion
pp. 125-143
Abstract
The main elements of Stevenson's theory are by now familiar. A psychological distinction between cognition and interest is used to distinguish two different types of disagreement: disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude. These are distinguished according to which kinds of psychological orientation (beliefs and/ or attitudes) are called into question or put at stake by the disagreement. The pragmatic meaning of the utterances occurring in the disagreement will indicate which psychological attitudes and/ or beliefs are required as part of one's commitment in accepting those utterances. The presence of conativeaffective attitudes (or interests) in question preserves the reality of there being an issue. Conative-affective attitudes bring values into play, although value judgements will express not only attitudes but generally also beliefs.
Publication details
Published in:
Satris Stephen (1987) Ethical emotivism. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 125-143
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-3507-5_6
Full citation:
Satris Stephen (1987) Reasons and persuasion, In: Ethical emotivism, Dordrecht, Springer, 125–143.