Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

186644

Nietzsche on philosophy, interpretation and truth

Richard Schacht

pp. 1-19

Abstract

"Interpretation" according to Nietzsche, has always been the actual — if generally unacknowledged — activity of philosophers and other thinkers, at least to the extent that they have been more than mere philosophical and intellectual "laborers" content to work within and with the framework of interpretations developed by others. And it is his further contention that genuine philosophers — including the "new philosophers" he envisions and calls for — will not and should not abandon interpretation in favor of some more "exact" form of thinking and reasoning, but rather must engage more self-consciously and deliberately and less dogmatically in it. So he characterizes his own philosophical activity as interpretive, despite the fact that this would appear to place his own positions on a par with those he rejects and brands as "lies," "errors," and "fictions." "Supposing that this also is only interpretation — and you will be eager enough to make this objection? — well, so much the better" (BGE 22).

Publication details

Published in:

Yovel Yirmiyahu (1986) Nietzsche as affirmative thinker: papers presented at the fifth Jerusalem philosophical encounter, april 1983. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 1-19

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-4360-5_1

Full citation:

Schacht Richard (1986) „Nietzsche on philosophy, interpretation and truth“, In: Y. Yovel (ed.), Nietzsche as affirmative thinker, Dordrecht, Springer, 1–19.