In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly concerned with the question of whether philosophical intuitions are reliable sources of evidence. Experimental philosophers, in particular, have begun to make an impact on the way mainstream philosophers think about the role of intuitions in philosophy. They argue that it is possible for good empirical work to reveal the truth about the nature and reliability of the intuitions that philosophy has relied on so heavily.¹ For example, the positive experimentalist program has it that intuitions may be reliably used only insofar as they can be properly calibrated by empirical science. The negative program has it that intuitions are generally unreliable sources of evidence, and that empirical science will show us how and why. My project is to demonstrate, from a contemporary Kantian point of view, that neither of these programs is satisfactory. First, I hope to show that there is a categorical difference between the kind of intuitions experimental philosophers actually take seriously and the kind of intuitions that we ought to take seriously, namely, authoritative rational intuitions.² And second, I hope to show that a careful focus on authoritative rational intuitions can defeat some of the most worrisome problems that have been presented by intuition-skeptical empiricists.