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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

147709

The reduction

John Drummond(Fordham University)

pp. 46-59

Abstract

Husserl has said in both editions of LU that acts with a common matter intend the same objectivity. In speaking of this intentional objectivity, Husserl tells us, we are not concerned with the sense in which we speak of its "being;" we are unconcerned, that is, with whether the intentional object is real or ideal, actual (wahrhaft), possible or impossible (LU II/1, 427 [II, 587]). It is this indifference to the mode of the object's existence which becomes prominent in Husserl's later theory of the phenomenological reduction.

Publication details

Published in:

Drummond John (1990) Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism. Dordrecht, Kluwer.

Pages: 46-59

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-1974-7_4

Full citation:

Drummond John (1990) The reduction, In: Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 46–59.