Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

147618

Reference to something in activities of presentation

Eduard Marbach(University of Bern)

pp. 41-58

Abstract

The account of mental representation to be developed in this study is based upon the difference and yet inner relatedness between mental activities by which reference is made to something in its absence and those by which reference is made to something in its presence.2 Wherever something absent is referred to we are dealing with representations (Vergegenwärtigungen). The notion of "representation" which will be argued for here is, if not explicitly stated otherwise, understood as referring to activities of representing something that is not itself present. This is important for it links the topic of mental representation at once to the topic of consciousness. It will be recalled that, on the present view, mental activities are indeed essentially conscious, whatever else they may be besides that. Or the other way around, to be conscious is essentially to be mentally active in one way or another, whatever else may also be required for consciousness to be functioning (e.g. from neurophysiological and biological points of view, etc.).3

Publication details

Published in:

Marbach Eduard (1993) Mental representation and consciousness: towards a phenomenological theory of representation and reference. Dordrecht, Kluwer.

Pages: 41-58

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2239-1_3

Full citation:

Marbach Eduard (1993) Reference to something in activities of presentation, In: Mental representation and consciousness, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 41–58.