Regarding the final trend in the assessment of the issues involved in the Husserl-Heidegger relation evident in the literature, the variation of this trend found in Landgrebe's seminal discussion of the "shipwreck" of Husserl's project, will be discussed within the context of my investigation of the status of the phenomenon of intentionality in Husserl's and Heidegger's formulations of phenomenology. Landgrebe's analysis of Husserl's project focuses on the "fact that for Husserl being [Sein]primarily signifies being-an-object [Gegenstand-sein]for an act of consciousness which presents it."¹ According to Landgrebe, this understanding of being is "rooted in Husserl's interpretation of the essence and achievement of phenomenological reflection."² This interpretation is problematical for Landgrebe, inasmuch as "what Husserl had correctly seen under the title of transcendental subjectivity,"³ includes a dimension which "can neither be objectified nor brought under concepts of objective being,"⁴ and therefore, "can never be overtaken by representing [objectifying] reflection."⁵ Husserl's attempt to nevertheless accomplish just this, has the result, for Landgrebe, that Husserl's account of transcendental subjectivity "becomes so obscured that he was not able to arrive at an unequivocal determination of this concept."⁶ The influence of Heidegger on these analyses is clear from Landgrebe's characterization, of this non-objectifiable dimension of transcendental subjectivity, in terms of "intentionality in the sense of "being-alreadyahead-of-itself' (transcendence in the sense of Heidegger)... [which is]... unable to grasp itself in this structure in an objectifying reflection."⁷