The intentionality of logical significance and material ontological meaning
pp. 32-43
Abstract
In Chapter Two of my study of Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality, I will be concerned with bringing into relief the phenomenal state of affairs that lead him to differentiate, not only the intentional structure of logical signification (Bedeutung) from the intentional structure of material ontological meaning (Sinn), but also to maintain an exclusive philosophical importance for the latter. I find this state of affairs to be extremely important on at least two counts.
Publication details
Published in:
Hopkins Burt C (1993) Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger: the problem of the original method and phenomenon of phenomenology. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 32-43
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5_3
Full citation:
Hopkins Burt C (1993) The intentionality of logical significance and material ontological meaning, In: Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger, Dordrecht, Springer, 32–43.