International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article


A dilemma for anomalous monism

Brian P McLaughlin

pp. 21-45


Jaegwon Kim is often viewed as having proposed a dilemma for Donald Davidson: if when Davidson appealed to psychophysical supervenience in “Mental Events,” his appeal was to weak supervenience, then he failed to state how mental properties depend on physical properties; and if his appeal was instead to strong supervenience, then he was appealing to a thesis that is incompatible with anomalous monism. I examine this dilemma in detail, pointing out that it is actually a dilemma for the doctrine of anomalous monism itself. I ultimately argue that it is a false dilemma. But I then state a related dilemma that poses a serious, unresolved prima facie problem for anomalous monism.

Publication details

Published in:

Caminada Emanuele, Summa Michela (2015) Supervenience and the theory of experience. Metodo 3 (2).

Pages: 21-45

DOI: 10.19079/metodo.3.2.21

Full citation:

McLaughlin Brian P (2015) „A dilemma for anomalous monism“. Metodo 3 (2), 21–45.