The skeptical arguments against realism i
inductive skepticism
pp. 7-36
Abstract
Our aim is to show how we can have good reasons for claims about the unobservable, theoretical claims made by science. But: there are objections to the thesis that we can have such reasons. The aim of the early chapters of this book is to critically evaluate those objections. In this chapter we will only be concerned with one of the objections: Humean skepticism about induction.
Publication details
Published in:
Wright John (2018) An epistemic foundation for scientific realism: defending realism without inference to the best explanation. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 7-36
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1_2
Full citation:
Wright John (2018) The skeptical arguments against realism i: inductive skepticism, In: An epistemic foundation for scientific realism, Dordrecht, Springer, 7–36.