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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

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212268

An epistemic foundation for scientific realism

defending realism without inference to the best explanation

John Wright

Abstract

This monograph develops a new way of justifying the claims made by science about phenomenon not directly observable by humans, such as atoms and black holes. It details a way of making inferences to the existence and properties of unobservable entities and states of affairs that can be given a probabilistic justification. The inferences used to establish realist claims are not a form of, and neither do they rely on, inference to the best explanation.

The final chapters apply the developed conceptual apparatus to key cases from the history of science and from recent science. One example concerns realism with respect to atoms. Another looks at inferences from recent astronomical data to conclusions about the size and shape of those parts of the universe lying beyond that which we can observe.

Details | Table of Contents

Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Dordrecht

Year: 2018

Pages: 220

Series: Synthese Library

Series volume: 402

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1

ISBN (hardback): 978-3-030-02217-4

ISBN (digital): 978-3-030-02218-1

Full citation:

Wright John (2018) An epistemic foundation for scientific realism: defending realism without inference to the best explanation. Dordrecht, Springer.