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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

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201842

Abstract

In this essay we have attempted to map the way from traditional to transcendental logic — which is not a second logic, but only radical and concrete logic itself, which accrues by phenomenological method. Yet, to speak more precisely, what we had in mind as this transcendental logic is only the traditionally limited logic, analytic logic, which, to be sure, by virtue of its empty-formal universality, embraces all spheres of being and objects and, correlatively, all spheres of cognition. Nevertheless, under the necessity of outlining the sense and the breadth of transcendental research, we acquired also a preliminary understanding of those "logics' (in another sense) that should be established: the material theories of science, among which the highest and most inclusive would be the logic of the absolute science, the logic of transcendental-phenomenological philosophy itself.

Publication details

Published in:

Husserl Edmund (1969). Formal and transcendental logic, transl. D. Cairns, Nijhoff, Den Haag.

Pages: 291-293

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1111-2_15

Full citation:

Husserl Edmund (1969). Conclusion, in Formal and transcendental logic, Den Haag, Nijhoff, pp. 291-293.