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Objective logic and the phenomenology of reason
It was the evidence-problems connected with the fundamental concepts and laws of logic that led us (since it is evidence that is constitutive for truth, and for what truly exists in every sense accepted by us) to the most universal constitutional problems and the radical nature of the method appropriate to them. If logic, as having originated from a naive evidence, is not to remain suspended sky-high above any possible application, these problems, in their hierarchical sequence, must/be set and solved. For only a clarified sense prescribes the sphere of its legitimate application. The formal theory of science should enounce an Apriori for possible science as such: the great problem, How is science possible?, is not removed, analogically speaking, by 'solvitur ambulando". The possibility of science cannot be shown by the fact of sciences, since the fact itself is shown only by <their> subsumption under that possibility as an idea. Thus we are led back to logic, to its apriori principles and theories. But now logic itself is in question with regard to its possibility; and, in our progressive criticisms, it is continuously and very seriously called in question. These criticism lead us, from logic as theory, back to logical reason and the new field of theory pertaining to it.
Husserl Edmund (1969). Formal and transcendental logic, transl. D. Cairns, Nijhoff, Den Haag.
Husserl Edmund (1969). Objective logic and the phenomenology of reason, in Formal and transcendental logic, Den Haag, Nijhoff, pp. 267-290.