Much like our earlier encounter with the Opus Postumum, our treatment of Nietzsche's notebooks on teleology left us facing the x of production, the opaque but imperious demand for an approach to individuation that would suspend or overcome the parameters of the "Antinomy of Teleological Judgment" — that is, the partition between a merely regulative speculation concerned with teleological organization, on the one hand, and a determinant mechanistic causality, on the other. Simply by posing the problem of the genesis of the intellect, Nietzsche exposed the hastiness and fragility of such a partition, predicated as it is upon a stark demarcation between modalities of individuation that themselves remain insufficiently accounted for, not to mention laden with the prejudices of common sense. The theme of asymmetry, arguably the driving force behind Nietzsche's successive reductions, casts suspicion on the legitimacy of any approach that would subordinate all accounts of individuation — and a fortiori of "life" or "production" — to the form of objectivity that the subject of cognition demands as its indispensable correlate. Yet for all its corrosive impetus, and despite representing a considerable achievement in its own right, Nietzsche's bold reduction of the anomaly of the organic to the plural ontology of vital production does not go beyond a preparatory deployment of the problem of a non-representational (or non-intellectualist) ontology of individuation.