Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

215175

On the transcendence and reality of Husserlian objects

Yutaka Tomiyama

pp. 45-56

Abstract

We often expect Husserl's concept of intentionality to be the key to opening our minds to the world. The phenomenological sphere of consciousness is not a closed encapsulated sphere, but open to the world. The phenomenological method, however, forbids appealing to naïve realism exclusively as it concentrates on immanently accessible conscious experiences. How can these two features be compatible with one another? This paper examines this question while seeking to justify Husserl's claim that an intentional object is the real and actual object itself, and transcendent in the sense that it is beyond our grasp of meanings.

Publication details

Published in:

de Warren Nicolas, Taguchi Shigeru (2019). New phenomenological studies in Japan, Springer, Dordrecht.

Pages: 45-56

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11893-8_4

Full citation:

Tomiyama Yutaka (2019). On the transcendence and reality of Husserlian objects, in N. De Warren & S. Taguchi (eds.), New phenomenological studies in Japan, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 45-56.