Things and reality
a problem for Husserl's theory of constitution
In Ideas II and other works, Edmund Husserl gives a constitutional analysis of material reality. His basic thought on this matter is that a material thing is constituted when it is shown to causally depend on its surrounding circumstances. In this essay, I will first try to show that this appeal to causal dependence involves an important problem, namely, the circularity or regress problem. I then consider how this problem can be solved from both theoretical and exegetical standpoints. As a key that could lead to a solution, I propose the hypothesis that Husserl's notion of reality is holistic. By attributing this notion to Husserl, I argue that we can find a satisfactory answer to the aforementioned problem, as well as a perspicuous way of understanding some of his passages.
de Warren Nicolas, Taguchi Shigeru (2019). New phenomenological studies in Japan, Springer, Dordrecht.
Akiba Takeshi (2019). Things and reality: a problem for Husserl's theory of constitution, in N. De Warren & S. Taguchi (eds.), New phenomenological studies in Japan, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 29-44.