Aristotle might well be called the first phenomenologist of moral experience. Recall, for example, his careful attention to the "phenomena," to common opinions about happiness or—as a phenomenologist might put it—to happiness and the virtues as commonly understood. Recall too his meticulous, dialectical considerations of these phenomena, considerations reminiscent of imaginative variations and designed to achieve insight into the nature of happiness and the virtues. Recall, even more importantly, his account of moral intentionality—of the unified role of practical wisdom, the emotions, and "perception" in moral experience—and, finally, his distinction between merely voluntary and chosen actions, the former aimed at an end (e.g., satisfying hunger), but the latter undertaken in the light of an end (e.g., eating low-fat foods for the sake of health). In discussing the relation between Aristotelianism and phenomenology, therefore, we could well and fruitfully explore the various ways in which Aristotle himself and the contemporary advocates of a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics develop phenomenological themes and methodologies in their work.¹