Aristotle and Husserl on feelings in moral sense
Philia and love
This paper concerns both Aristotle's notion of right feelings and Husserl's account of intentional feelings and emotions as developed in their ethical writings and it discusses these approaches in relation to each other. It addresses the question of motivation and justification or evidence for moral feelings and actions. In particular, it focuses on the emotional states of Philia and love as well as the inherent relationship between affectivity and reason. The paper concludes with some reflections on the requirements for the constitution of a moral self.
Guccinelli Roberta, Iocco Gemmo (2020). Positive feelings on the border between phenomenology, psychology and virtue ethics. Metodo 8 (2).
Breuer Irene (2020). Aristotle and Husserl on feelings in moral sense: Philia and love. Metodo 8 (2), pp. 31-67.