Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

234309

Nominalism, realism and objectivity

Catherine Z. Elgin

pp. 519-534

Abstract

I argue that constructive nominalism is preferable to scientific realism. Rather than reflecting without distortion the way the mind-independent world is, theories refract. They provide an understanding of the world as modulated by a particular theory. Truth is defined within a theoretical framework rather than outside of it. This does not undermine objectivity, for an assertion contains a (perhaps tacit) reference to the framework in terms of which its truth is claimed.

Publication details

Published in:

Rowbottom Darrell P., Asay Jamin (2019) Scientific realism. Synthese 196 (2).

Pages: 519-534

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1114-0

Full citation:

Elgin Catherine Z. (2019) „Nominalism, realism and objectivity“. Synthese 196 (2), 519–534.