Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

229645

Extreme obviousness and the "zero-person" perspective

why is the problem of the "primal I" fundamental for transcendental phenomenology?

Shigeru Taguchi

pp. 15-37

Abstract

Transcendental reflection does not simply withdraw from natural life and go somewhere else. On the contrary, it is a self-elucidation of natural life performed within this life itself. However, natural life has an inherent automatic system for concealing itself. Therefore, in order to make manifest the truly natural state of natural life, we need a deliberate method of outfoxing the natural attitude as it constantly tries to trick us. If so, the transcendental perspective is closely related to Husserl’s perplexing concept of “primal I”. It expresses a primitive perspective of our experience that cannot be identified with the first-person perspective. Phenomenology is not merely an investigation of experience from the first-person point of view, but a philosophical thinking from a “zero person” perspective that makes it possible for us to understand the relativity of our own first-person experience, and how it is related to other first-person experiences and the third-person perspective.

Publication details

Published in:

Aurora Simone (2019). On the transcendental III. Metodo Special Issue 1.3.

Pages: 15-37

DOI: 10.19079/metodo.s1.3.15

Full citation:

Taguchi Shigeru (2019). Extreme obviousness and the "zero-person" perspective: why is the problem of the "primal I" fundamental for transcendental phenomenology?. Metodo 1.3, pp. 15-37.