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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

216851

Nothing good will come from giving up on aetiological accounts of teleology

John Basl

pp. 543-546

Abstract

One reason that developments in synthetic biology are philosophically interesting is that they force us to reconsider a central dogma of environmental ethics, namely that there is some fundamental difference between artifacts and organisms such that the latter have goods or interests of their own that are due moral consideration while the former do not. The creation of entities that are at the same time artifacts and organisms forces us to clarify and reflect on existing accounts of the metaphysical and moral distinctions many environmental ethicists have wanted to make between entities of these kinds. In “Biological Interests, Normative Functions, and Synthetic Biology”, Sune Holm (2012) explores the challenge that synthetic or fully artifactual organisms raise for one of the most prominent accounts that supports the central dogma just described.1While various environmental ethicists have attempted to ground the interests, goods, or welfare of non-sentient organisms in their...

Publication details

Published in:

Powell Russell, Kahane Guy, Savulescu Julian (2012) Evolution, genetic engineering and human enhancement. Philosophy & Technology 25 (4).

Pages: 543-546

DOI: 10.1007/s13347-012-0079-2

Full citation:

Basl John (2012) „Nothing good will come from giving up on aetiological accounts of teleology“. Philosophy & Technology 25 (4), 543–546.