Demystifying Roman Ingarden's purely intentional objects of perception
pp. 139-162
Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to eliminate a seeming redundancy in Roman Ingarden's theory of perceptual intentionality and, through this, provide a modest and partial defense of his theory. I shall first argue that, contrary to an impression one might initially have, Ingarden's notion of purely intentional objects of perception is not superfluous; purely intentional objects of perception play a role as representational contents. Second, I shall point out that Ingarden's theory has some merits that prove it to be worthy of serious and closer consideration for us today.
Publication details
Published in:
de Warren Nicolas, Taguchi Shigeru (2019) New phenomenological studies in Japan. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 139-162
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11893-8_11
Full citation:
Uemura Genki (2019) „Demystifying Roman Ingarden's purely intentional objects of perception“, In: N. De Warren & S. Taguchi (eds.), New phenomenological studies in Japan, Dordrecht, Springer, 139–162.