Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

213504

Rules as reason-giving facts

a difference-making-based account of the normativity of rules

Peng-Hsiang WangLinton Wang

pp. 199-213

Abstract

In his "Reasoning with Rules," Joseph Raz raises a puzzling question about the normativity of rules: "How can it be that rules are reasons when they do not point to a good in the action for which they are reasons?" In this paper, we put forward a difference-making-based theory of reasons to resolve Raz's puzzle. This theory distinguishes between reasons and reason-giving facts, and we argue that rules are not reasons but rather reason-giving facts. Based on this distinction, we recast and criticize some of Raz's theses about the nature of rules, such as their opaqueness, the normative gap, and the breakdown of transitivity in the content-independent justification of rules. Finally, we propose a difference-making-based account of the reason-giving force of rules.

Publication details

Published in:

Araszkiewicz Michał, Banaś Paweł, Gizbert-Studnicki Tomasz, Płeszka Krzysztof (2015) Problems of normativity, rules and rule-following. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 199-213

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_15

Full citation:

Wang Peng-Hsiang, Wang Linton (2015) „Rules as reason-giving facts: a difference-making-based account of the normativity of rules“, In: M. Araszkiewicz, P. Banaś, T. Gizbert-Studnicki & K. Płeszka (eds.), Problems of normativity, rules and rule-following, Dordrecht, Springer, 199–213.