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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

211745

On Bennett's "analytic transcendental arguments"

Stephan Körner

pp. 65-69

Abstract

Professor Bennett freely admits that his understanding of what a "transcendental argument" is, differs from the Kantian and that he uses the term in his own — rather special — way. Although I am opposed to such terminological separatism, I shall not argue against it here. Nor shall I discuss the interesting remarks which lead up to, and which follow, what I take to be the central part of Bennett's paper, namely the characterization and exemplification of what he calls "analytic transcendental arguments". In examining them I shall be mainly concerned with their tendency to leave open deductive gaps between their premises and their conclusions, and with the difficulty of bridging these gaps in a satisfactory manner — a difficulty which they share with other transcendental arguments and which seems insuperable to me.

Publication details

Published in:

Bieri Peter, Horstmann Rolf-Peter, Krüger Lorenz (1979) Transcendental arguments and science: essays in epistemology. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 65-69

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9410-2_5

Full citation:

Körner Stephan (1979) „On Bennett's "analytic transcendental arguments"“, In: P. Bieri, R.-P. Horstmann & L. Krüger (eds.), Transcendental arguments and science, Dordrecht, Springer, 65–69.