A note on transcendental propositions in Kant's critique of pure reason
pp. 37-43
Abstract
Right in the opening section of his paper on "Transcendental Proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason"1 Baum displays discontent with those interpreters who suppose that instead of asking: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?, Kant is really asking: What are the necessary conditions of a possible experience?2 Baum is of the opinion that strategies which reduce Kant's question to that form cannot give a satisfying account of the sort of theory the Critique of Pure Reason has to offer.
Publication details
Published in:
Bieri Peter, Horstmann Rolf-Peter, Krüger Lorenz (1979) Transcendental arguments and science: essays in epistemology. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 37-43
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9410-2_3
Full citation:
Cramer Konrad (1979) „A note on transcendental propositions in Kant's critique of pure reason“, In: P. Bieri, R.-P. Horstmann & L. Krüger (eds.), Transcendental arguments and science, Dordrecht, Springer, 37–43.