In this paper I undertake an analysis of the heritage of Kuhn and Feyerabend as compared with the main tenets of the logical positivism, and identify the components of logical positivism that directly lead to relativism. I argue that the notion of consensus creates major problems in historiography and philosophy of science, preventing a description of scientific change. I further argue that the concept of creative disagreement should be introduced into studies of science not only as a historical actuality, but also as a basic epistemological and methodological presupposition. I trace the grip of the notion of consensus in social studies of science to Durkheim's heritage, focusing on the representatives of the Strong Program in sociology of science. I also argue that Thomas Kuhn inherited the same Durkheimian view of society through Ludwik Fleck Finally, I briefly outline a dialogical alternative to the current historiography—an alternative in which the notion of disagreement plays a fundamental epistemological role.