Problems with prolifigate Platonism
pp. 172-193
Abstract
Variations on a new platonist epistemology have been offered recently. Mark Balaguer (1995, 1998a & 1998b) offers one version, and Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta (1995) another. Although there are important differences between their proposals, what they have in common is the suggestion that if there is a plenitude of mathematical entities, then there is no problem about acquiring knowledge of them. I first discuss Balaguer's proposal and then discuss the extent to which Linsky and Zalta's account faces similar problems.1
Publication details
Published in:
Cheyne Colin (2001) Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects: causal objections to Platonism. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 172-193
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9747-0_12
Full citation:
Cheyne Colin (2001) Problems with prolifigate Platonism, In: Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects, Dordrecht, Springer, 172–193.