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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

211015

The burden of proof

Colin Cheyne

pp. 123-130

Abstract

Suppose platonists could counter my causal objections and demonstrate that it is possible for us to have knowledge of acausal objects. This would still not establish the platonist position. First, I argue that the burden of proof is on platonists to explain how we do have such knowledge. Then I examine platonist attempts to provide such an explanation. I show that they are inadequate.

Publication details

Published in:

Cheyne Colin (2001) Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects: causal objections to Platonism. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 123-130

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9747-0_8

Full citation:

Cheyne Colin (2001) The burden of proof, In: Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects, Dordrecht, Springer, 123–130.