Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

210983

Underdetermination as a path to structural realism

Katherine BradingAlexander Skiles

pp. 99-115

Abstract

We examine the argument for ontic structural realism that begins from an alleged "metaphysical underdetermination" afflicting contemporary fundamental physics. Current discussions have focussed on challenging this underdetermination claim. Our purpose here is to examine what follows even if the premise concerning underdetermination is conceded. We consider the additional premises needed to arrive at an endorsement of ontic structural realism, and show that each can and should be rejected. Moreover, the ontic structural realist program faces an analogous metaphysical underdetermination issue of its own. We conclude that the argument fails, independently of whether the alleged metaphysical underdetermination is conceded.

Publication details

Published in:

Landry Elaine, Rickles Dean P. (2012) Structural realism: structure, object, and causality. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 99-115

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-2579-9_5

Full citation:

Brading Katherine, Skiles Alexander (2012) „Underdetermination as a path to structural realism“, In: E. Landry & D. P. Rickles (eds.), Structural realism, Dordrecht, Springer, 99–115.