As the name of this chapter implies, I apply my previous characterizations of rationality, rationalism, and naturalism to the prominent dialectical ethical theories of Hare, Gewirth, and Habermas. All three theories share important commonalities with regards to pragmatic consistency and practical justification. These commonalities constitute a major strength in their theories and thus actually offer a powerful collective dialectical model, but their accounts fail to address and incorporate many important features of rationality as I have characterized it and, as such, fail to recognize the meta-theoretical basis for aretaic and teleological conceptions of action, behavior, and general states of affairs. Not only does the dialectical approach inherently de-emphasize the theoretical consequences of experiential rationality and thereby fail to have application to what might be considered general questions of value (such as the questions cited at the beginning of this book, as well as even such questions as "What is good?" and "What is better?"), but its dialectical conception of logical judgment is also limited by its depiction of ethical judgment as purely dialectical. I show, therefore, that there are major semantic and conceptual gaps in this theoretical framework with regards to definitions of "good," "better," "ought," and "must" and that, without accompanying analyses and characterizations of these concepts, certain major components of their theories are exposed as vapid and lacking in directional content. It can be shown, I argue, that, because such theoretical frameworks overlook such analyses, they miss a vital foundational component of their own theories, a component that is inherently aretaic in nature.