Many of us today who work in the philosophy of religion are in broad agreement with William Alston that the most viable defence of religious belief has to be a defence of the rationality of basing beliefs (with many qualifying provisos which Alston has carefully set forth) on religious experience. From the point of view of a Christian philosopher — as distinguished from a philosopher simply as such — there is, however, an obvious challenge to this in the fact that the same epistemological principle establishes the rationality of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, etc. in holding beliefs that are at least partly, and sometimes quite radically, incompatible with the Christian belief-system. Belief in the reality of Allah, Vishnu, Shiva and of the non-personal Brahman, Dharmakaya, Tao, seem to be as experientially well based as belief in the reality of the Holy Trinity. Alston himself acknowledges this as "the most difficult problem for my position"¹ and this view is reflected in the fact that a third of the Festschrift recently published in his honour² is devoted to this topic.