Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

209251

Causation, fictionalism and non-cognitivism

Berkeley and Hume

P. J. E. Kail

pp. 31-40

Abstract

"Non-cognitivism", a creature of the twentieth century, is nevertheless associated with David Hume and George Berkeley, two figures of the eighteenth, often in relation to their ethical theories. I am not here concerned with the history of this association, nor with the application (or misapplication) of "non-cognitivism" to Hume's or Berkeley's views on ethical thought and talk. Instead I want to compare their treatments of the causal relation, and probe the extent to which each can be understood as offering, albeit in embryonic form, a non-cognitivist account of it. The purpose of this exercise, however, is not taxonomic. It is questionable whether such an exercise would be of much weight or interest, even if we were to ignore the obvious problem of anachronism. For the identity of "non-cognitivism" is itself contested in contemporary philosophy, and so there is, in fact, no settled way to determine what exactly is "non-cognitivism". Because any definition of "non-cognivism" would, of necessity, foreclose on a host of difficult matters I shall not offer any such definition. I shall instead examine the accounts of Hume and Berkeley with an eye to what kinds of considerations might invite the label "non-cognitivism" and in what senses that label might be appropriate.

Publication details

Published in:

Parigi Silvia (2011) George Berkeley: religion and science in the age of enlightenment. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 31-40

DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-9243-4_3

Full citation:

Kail P. J. E. (2011) „Causation, fictionalism and non-cognitivism: Berkeley and Hume“, In: S. Parigi (ed.), George Berkeley, Dordrecht, Springer, 31–40.