Social constructivism and naturalism come in many varieties. Still, in the main, social constructivism combines a naturalistic component – it aims for a naturalistic, i.e., empirically warranted account of science as it is – with a rejection of the epistemic privilege claimed by natural science, based on its alleged success and on the alleged rationality of its method. In the main, scientific naturalism, the default position for contemporary rationalist philosophers, while espousing the Quinean strategy of adopting the scientific stance with respect to science itself, regards the epistemic superiority of natural science as an empirically well-supported tenet. Hence what is generally seen as an insoluble conflict. "Liberal" versions of naturalism have been recently proposed, however, which share an attitude of caution regarding the wholesale acceptance of natural science as sole provider of genuine knowledge. The question then arises whether social constructivism can be accommodated within some version of liberal naturalism. I argue that social constructivism must choose between renouncing its naturalistic component altogether, by rejecting the idea of a language- and practice independent world, and dissolving into liberal naturalism.