How do individuals act when rational action is not possible? Using Gintis 's 2009 beliefs, preferences, and constraints model, I delineate his three necessary conditions for rational action in the economist's sense of the concept. In order to demonstrate that rational action is not always possible, I provide a range of examples where one or more of Gintis 's conditions are not met. I label these "inchoate" situations. I then consider the wide variety of behaviors that can occur in inchoate situations. I describe these as "extra-rational" behaviors. Importantly, I show that extra-rational behavior can be intentional without being rational. I conclude by arguing that the social sciences need multiple, potentially complementary, models of action. Psychology's recent distinction between System I and System II thinking represents an important move in this direction. The idea of extra-rational behavior strategies for action in inchoate situations potentially provides another additional type of action that is not rational.