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Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments
Let us return to our demonstration that the eidetic laws and possibly developed disciplines of the lower level are simultaneously and inseparably formal-ontological and apophantic, since they do indeed relate expressly not only to formal signification-categories but also to formal object-categories.1 Naturally the very same is true of fully developed formal analytics, because theory-forms, according to their own sense, have as their correlates objective multiplicities. The consistently followed path of inquiry into the formal conditions for possible truth and finally for true science, the path starting from the propositional structure of a science (that is: from the significational side), led at the same time — precisely by virtue of the sense-relation to objectivities that is involved in the propositions themselves — to an all-embracing formal ontology, which at its highest level defines the name: theory of multiplicities.
Husserl Edmund (1969). Formal and transcendental logic, transl. D. Cairns, Nijhoff, Den Haag.
Husserl Edmund (1969). Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments, in Formal and transcendental logic, Den Haag, Nijhoff, pp. 105-129.