If confronted with the question whether the role of relations of domination can be overestimated, Pierre Bourdieu's answer would undoubtedly be "no". Jacques Rancière, by contrast, would oppose all forms of critique that focus on such relations. Unfortunately, the two French intellectuals never discussed their views together, at least not in public. All we have is Rancière's fervent critique of Bourdieu in The Philosopher and His Poor and an aside in the Preface to the second French edition of this work.² However, in what follows I will try to stage a dispute between Bourdieu and Rancière in order to put their respective accounts of the role of domination and its critique into perspective. On this basis I will present both approaches as complementary, yet irreconcilable parts of a conception of critique that can account for the intricacies of critical practices. Whereas Bourdieu rightfully reminds us of the difficulty, if not — in some cases — the impossibility, of an effective critique of relations of domination, Rancière emphasises precisely the possibility of successful critique and resistance even in contexts of crass forms of domination. Moreover, in contrast to Bourdieu, who focuses on how things should not be, Rancière's mode of critique consists in affirming emancipatory moves.