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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

196146

Epistemic replacement relativism defended

Martin Kusch

pp. 165-175

Abstract

In this paper I shall offer a response to Paul Boghossian's recent criticism of "replacement relativism". Replacement relativism is the main semantic strategy for making sense of philosophical forms of relativism. Replacement relativism was first formulated by Gilbert Harman (1996a, b). It models philosophical relativism on relativization in the natural sciences.

Publication details

Published in:

Surez Mauricio, Dorato Mauro, Rédei Miklós (2010) Epsa epistemology and methodology of science: launch of the European philosophy of science association. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 165-175

DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_14

Full citation:

Kusch Martin (2010) „Epistemic replacement relativism defended“, In: M. Surez, M. Dorato & M. Rédei (eds.), Epsa epistemology and methodology of science, Dordrecht, Springer, 165–175.