The main problems dealt with in Carl Lesche's paper are the epistemological-methodological status of psychotherapies based upon psychoanalytic theory, the ontological-methodological status of psychoanalytic theory, and the nature of the psychoanalytic process. The paper also addresses itself to the problem of the unity of the sciences and comes to the conclusion that psychoanalysis is not a natural science. It emphasizes that psychological theories (being theories about mental or, in general, phenomenal phenomena) are, in principle, not reducible to biological, physiological, neurological, or other theories, either in the sense of reduction through definitions or in the weaker sense of reduction through laws. There is an extensive literature on that topic. Let me just say that I agree with Lesche's thesis. I suppose that—to put it in a nutshell—the reductionists are confusing cause and motive. By claiming that my desire to do X is the "cause" of my doing X they disregard the fact that whereas physical causes necessitate, motives incline but do not necessitate. To assert that a person has a desire to do X may make it predictable or intelligible that he or she will in fact do X. But no contingent necessity or contingent impossibility is involved. Man can, and cannot but, choose, each and everyone choosing for themselves alone (Flew, 1983). Hence, the philosophical implications of behavioristic theorizing include an image of man that is not "half true," but completely wrong.