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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

194213

If my brain is damaged, do i become a different person?

Catherine Malabou and neuro-identity

Christopher Watkin

pp. 21-40

Abstract

The growing field of neuro-philosophy throws up important issues for our society about how we understand the persistence of personal identity over time: if my brain is damaged or otherwise altered, do I become a different person? This chapter explores some of the work of the French neuro-philosopher Catherine Malabou as she asks, and tries to answer, this fundamental question about who we think we are, giving a non-reductive materialist account of self-identity. I argue that Malabou has implicit within her writing the seeds of a more adequate account which would not understand identity and personhood to be immanent to the material brain but would embrace a broader notion of identity distributed across relationships, institutions, and shared common narratives.

Publication details

Published in:

Monk Nicholas, Lindgren Mia, McDonald Sarah, Pasfield-Neofitou Sarah (2017) Reconstructing identity: a transdisciplinary approach. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Pages: 21-40

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-58427-0_2

Full citation:

Watkin Christopher (2017) „If my brain is damaged, do i become a different person?: Catherine Malabou and neuro-identity“, In: N. Monk, M. Lindgren, S. Mcdonald & S. Pasfield-Neofitou (eds.), Reconstructing identity, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 21–40.