Book | Chapter
Mere belief as a modification
pp. 163-181
Abstract
The chapter uses the method of linguistic phenomenology to explain how belief in the sense of mere opinion can be understood as botched knowing. The distinction between attributive and nonattributive terms plays a central role in this explanation of belief. Several kinds of nonattributive terms are distinguished, modifying, restrictive and restorative terms, each being of use in the explanation of epistemic notions. And several forms of modification are distinguished: semantic, conceptual and ontological modification.
Publication details
Published in:
Reboul Anne (2014) Mind, values, and metaphysics II: philosophical essays in honor of Kevin Mulligan. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 163-181
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_11
Full citation:
van der Schaar Maria (2014) „Mere belief as a modification“, In: A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, values, and metaphysics II, Dordrecht, Springer, 163–181.