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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

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190425

Lecture III

Edmund Husserl

pp. 33-42

Abstract

By these considerations what the critique of cognition may and may not use has been precisely and adequately determined. What is especially puzzling for such a critique is the possibility of transcendence, but it may never under any conditions exploit for its purposes the actuality of transcendent things. Obviously the sphere of usable objects or of cognitions is limited to those which present themselves as valid, and which can remain free of the marks of epistemological vacuity; but this sphere is not empty. We have indubitably secured the whole realm of cogitationes. The existence of the cogitatio, more precisely the phenomenon of cognition itself, is beyond question; and it is free from the riddle of transcendence. These existing things are already presupposed in the statement of the problem of cognition. The question as to how transcendent things come into cognition would lose its sense if cognition itself, as well as the transcendent object, were put in question. It is also clear that the cogitationes present a sphere ofabsolutely immanent data; it is in this sense that we understand "immanence." In the 'seeing" pure phenomena the object is not outside cognition or outside "consciousness," while being given in the sense of the absolute self-givenness of something which is simply 'seen."

Publication details

Published in:

Husserl Edmund (1990) The idea of phenomenology. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 33-42

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2371-9_4

Full citation:

Husserl Edmund (1990) Lecture III, In: The idea of phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, 33–42.