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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

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189966

Cognitive autonomy and epistemology of action in Hayek's and Merleau-Ponty's thought

Francesco Di Iorio

pp. 149-176

Abstract

As is well known, the “chief interest behind Merleau-Ponty’s thought … was the phenomenology that emerged in Germany in the early decades of the twenty century” (Carman & Hansen 2005, p. 5). Founded by Edmund Husserl, phenomenology is a philosophical approach focusing on the nature of consciousness and notably on its intuitive and interpretative presuppositions. As Madison (1994, p. 38 ff.) remarks, in spite of the fact that Hayek cannot be considered a direct follower of Husserl, he shares, along with others members of the Austrian school, phenomenology’s dislike for scientistic objectivism. This point has been underlined by Udhen as well (2001, pp. 63, 140). Moreover, according to Udhen (pp. 114, 124), Hayek’s methodological individualism was significantly influenced by the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz, a follower of both Mises and Husserl (see also Cubeddu 1997; Smith 1996).

Publication details

Published in:

Frantz Roger, Leeson Robert (2013) Hayek and behavioral economics. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 149-176

DOI: 10.1057/9781137278159_7

Full citation:

Di Iorio Francesco (2013) „Cognitive autonomy and epistemology of action in Hayek's and Merleau-Ponty's thought“, In: R. Frantz & R. Leeson (eds.), Hayek and behavioral economics, Dordrecht, Springer, 149–176.