In the works of Kant (1724–1804), Fichte (1762–1814), and Hegel, German idealism effected a philosophical revolution in its new conceptions of reason, and of reason's practical role in legislating for morality and politics. The central tenet of Hegel's idealism is the unity of thought and being, a processual unity secured by the historical realization of reason in the world. Hegel's philosophy provided a self-conscious comprehension of this unity and its expressions in existence. In his Philosophy of Right (1820–1821), Hegel had asserted that the real is rational, and the rational is real;¹ but this is a speculative claim, affirming both identity and non-identity. Its ambiguity had serious exegetical consequences for Hegel's students and followers. The reality or effectiveness of reason could be understood to signify an ongoing historical process, still burdened with contradictions and insufficiencies that must be purged away in the course of further development. Alternatively, Hegel's claim might appear to confer rational legitimacy on the existing political and social order. The question is the extent to which the prevailing forms of religion, politics and society satisfy the demands of reason and freedom, and how are these standards themselves to be understood and defended? The Hegelian heritage split in response to these questions.