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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

188825

Noumenal ignorance

why, for Kant, can't we know things in themselves?

Alejandro Naranjo Sandoval Andrew Chignell

pp. 91-116

Abstract

In this chapter, Naranjo Sandoval and Chignell look at a few of the most prominent ways of articulating Kant's critical argument for Noumenal Ignorance – that is, the claim that we cannot cognize any substantive, synthetic truths about things in themselves – and then provide two different accounts of how to justify it.

Publication details

Published in:

(2017) The Palgrave Kant handbook. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Pages: 91-116

DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-54656-2_5

Full citation:

Naranjo Sandoval Alejandro, Chignell Andrew (2017) „Noumenal ignorance: why, for Kant, can't we know things in themselves?“, In: , The Palgrave Kant handbook, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 91–116.